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Abstract
It is well-known that the linear secret-sharing scheme (LSSS) can be constructed from linear
error-correcting codes (Brickell [1], R.J. McEliece and D.V.Sarwate [2],Cramer, el.,[3]). The
theory of linear codes from algebraic-geometric curves (algebraic-geometric (AG) codes or geo-
metric Goppa code) has been well-developed since the work of V.Goppa and Tsfasman, Vladut,
and Zink( see [17], [18] and [19]). In this paper the linear secret-sharing scheme from algebraic-
geometric codes, which are non-threshold schemes for curves of genus greater than 0, are pre-
sented . We analysis the minimal access structure, dmin and dcheat([8]), (strongly) multiplica-
tivity and the applications in verifiable secret-sharing (VSS) scheme and secure multi-party
computation (MPC) of this construction([3] and [10-11]). Our construction also offers many ex-
amples of the self-dually GF (q)-representable matroids and many examples of new ideal linear
secret-sharing schemes addressing to the problem of the characterization of the access structures
for ideal secret-sharing schemes([3] and [9]). The access structures of the linear secret-sharing
schemes from the codes on elliptic curves are given explicitly. From the work in this paper we
can see that the algebraic-geometric structure of the underlying algebraic curves is an impor-
tant resource for secret-sharing, matroid theory, verifiable secret-sharing and secure multi-party
computation.
Index Terms— Linear secret-sharing scheme(LSSS), verifiable secret-sharing(VSS), multi-
party computation, access(adversary) structure, algebraic-geometric code, algebraic curve
I. Introduction and Preliminaries
In a secret-sharing scheme among the set of participants P = {P1, ..., Pn}, a dealer P0, not in
P, has a secret, the dealer distributes the secret among P, that is gives each participant a share
of secret, in such a way that only the qualified subsets of P can reconstruct the secret from their
shares. The access structure , Γ ⊂ 2P, of a secret-sharing scheme is the defined to be the family of
the qualified subsets of P. The minimum accesss structure minΓ ⊂ 2P is defined to the be the set
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of minimum elements in Γ(here we use the natural order relation S1 < S2 if and only if S1 ⊂ S2 on
2P). The family of all subsets of P which are not qualified is called the adversary structure( see [3]
and 10]). We call a secret-sharing scheme a (k, n)-threshold scheme if the access structure consists
of the subset of at least k elements in the set P, where the number of elements in the set P is
exactly n, that is, among the n members any subset of k or more than k members can reconstruct
the secret. The first secrets-sharing scheme was given independently by Blakley [4] and Shamir
[5] in 1979, actually they gave threshold secret-sharing scheme. We call a secret-sharing scheme
perfect if the the unqualified subsets of members to reconstruct the secret have no information
of the secret. The existence of secret-sharing schemes with arbitrary given access structures was
proved in [6] and [7].
For a secret-sharing scheme, let V be the set of all possible shares (v1, ..., vn) (Here vi is the
share of the participant Pi for i = 1, ..., n). Then V is a error-correcting code(not necessarily
linear), let dmin be the minimum Hamming distance of this error-correcting code V. From the
error-correcting capability, it is clear that the cheaters can be identified from any share(presented
by the participants)(v1, ..., vn) if there are at most [(dmin− 1]/2] cheaters. In [2] McEliece and Sar-
wate proved that dmin = n−k+1 for Shamir’s (k, n)-threshold scheme. K.Okada and K.Kurosawa
introduced anther parameter dcheat for general secret-sharing scheme, as the the number such that
the correct secret value s can be recovered if there are at most [(dcheat − 1)/2] cheaters ([8]). It is
clear dmin ≤ dcheat, it is proved in [8] that dcheat = n −maxB∈(2P−Γ)|B|, where |B| is the number
of the elements in the set B.
Let K be a finite field. A K-linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS) on the set of participants
P = {P1, ..., Pn} is defined as a sequences of surjective linear mappings {T0, T1, ..., Tn}, where
Ti : E −→ Ei, E and Ei are finite dimensional spaces over K(E0 = K). For any x ∈ E,
{T1(x), ..., Tn(x)} are the shares of of the secret value k = T0(x). The complexity of the K-LSSS is
defined as λ(Γ) = Σni=1dimK(Ei), when the complexity is n, this LSSS is called ideal. One of the
main open problem in secrete sharing is the characterization of the access structures of ideal secret
sharing schemes (see [3] and [9]).
For an access structure Γ, λK(Γ) is defined to be the minimum of all the values Σ
n
i=1dimK(Ei)
for K-linear secret sharing schemes with access structure Γ(see [12-13]).A LSSS is called multi-
plicative, K-MLSSS if every participant i ∈ P can compute, form his shares ki, k
′
i of two shared
secrets k, k′ ∈ K, a value ci ∈ K such that the product kk′ is a linear combination of all the values
c1, ..., cn. It is called strongly multiplicative if for any subset A such that P−A is not qualified, the
product kk′ can be computed using only values from the participants in A. µK(Γ) is defined to be
the minimum of all the values of Σni=1dimK(Ei) for multiplicative K-linear secret sharing schemes
with access structure Γ. For an access structure Γ on P, it is said that Γ is Q2 if A
⋃
B 6= P for
any A,B ∈ Γ, Γ is Q3 if A
⋃
B
⋃
C 6= P for any A,B,C ∈ Γ. One of the key result in [10] is a
method to construct, from any LSSS with Q2 access structure Γ, a multiplicative LSSS with the
same access structure and double complexity, that is µ(Γ) ≤ 2λ(Γ). K-MLSSS and Q2 ,Q3 access
structure are closely related to secure multiparty computations (see [3],[10] and [11]).
The approach of secret-sharing based on error-correcting codes was studied in [1],[2],[3],[12-15].
It is found that actually Shamir’s (k, n)-threshold scheme is just the secret-sharing scheme based
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on the famous Reed-Solomon (RS) code. The error-correcting code based secret-sharing scheme
is defined as follow. Here we suppose C is a error-correcting codes over the finite field GF (q)
(where q is a prime power) with code length n + 1 and dimension k, i.e., C is a k dimension sub-
space of GF (q)n+1 The Hamming distance d(C) of this error-correcting code C is defined as follows.
d(C) = min{wt(v) : v ∈ C}
wt(v) = |{i : v = (v0, v1, ..., vn), vi 6= 0}|
,where wt(v) is called the Hamming weight of v. Let G = (gij)1≤i≤k,0≤j≤n be the generator matrix
of C, i.e., G is a k × (n + 1) matrix in which k rows of G is a base of the k dimension sub-
space C of GF (q)n+1. Suppose s is a given secret value of the dealer P0 and the secret is shared
among P = {P1, ..., Pn}, the set of n participants . Let g1 = (g11, ..., gk1)
T be the 1st column of
G. Chosen a random u = (u1, ..., uk) ∈ GF (q)
k such that s = uτg0 = Σuigi0. The codeword
c = (c0, ..., cN ) = uG, it is clear that c0 = s is the secret, then the dealer P0 gives the i− th partic-
ipant Pi the ci as the share of Pi for i = 1, ..., n. In this secret-sharing scheme the error-correcting
code C is assumed to be known to every participant and the dealer. For a secret sharing scheme
form error-correcting codes, suppose that Ti : GF (q)
k −→ GF (q) is defined as Ti(x) = x
τgi, where
i = 0, ..., n and gi is the i-th column of the generator matrix of the code C. In this form we see
that the secret sharing scheme is an ideal GF (q)-LSSS.
We refer the following Lemma to [12-15].
Lemma 1 (see [12-15]). Suppose the dual of C, C⊥ = {v = (v0, .., vn) : Gv = 0} has no code-
word of Hamming weight 1. In the above secret-sharing scheme based on the error-correcting code C,
(Pi1 , ..., Pim) can reconstruct the secret if and only if there is a codeword v = (1, 0, ..., vi1 , ..., vim , ...0)
in C⊥ such that vij 6= 0 for at least one j, where 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
The secret reconstruction is as follows, since Gv = 0, g1 = −Σ
m
j=1vijgij, where gh is the h− th
column of G for h = 1, ..., N . Then s = c0 = ug1 = −uΣ
m
j=1gij = −Σ
m
j=1vijcij .
For the definition of matroid and the matroid on the set P = {P1, ..., Pn} from a linear [n, k, d]
code, we refer to [16], it is well-known that the circuits (minimal dependent set) on the matroid from
a linear code is in one-to-one correspondence of the codewords with minimum Hamming weight d.
Thus a subset A of P = {P1, ..., Pn} is a minimal qualified subset of the LSSS from linear code C
if and only if {0}
⋃
A is a circuit in the matroid from C (see [3]).
We need recall some basic facts about algebraic-geometric codes( see [17],[18] and [19]). Let
X be an absolutely irreducible, projective and smooth curve defined over GF (q) with genus g,
D = {P0, ...Pn} be a set of GF (q)-rational points of X and G be a GF (q)-rational divisor satisfy-
ing supp(G)
⋂
D =, 2g−2 < deg(G) < n+1. Let L(G) = {f : (f)+G ≥ 0} is the linear space (over
GF (q)) of all rational functions with its divisor not smaller than −G and Ω(B) = {ω : (ω) ≥ B}
be the linear space of all differentials with their divisors not smaller than B. Then the functional
AG(algebraic-geometric )code CL(D,G) ∈ GF (q)
n+1 and residual AG(algebraic-geometric) code
CΩ(D,G) ∈ GF (q)
n+1 are defined. CL(D,G) is a [n+1, k = deg(G)− g+1, d ≥ n+1− deg(G)]
code over GF (q) and CΩ(D,G) is a [n + 1, k = n − deg(G) + g, d ≥ deg(G) − 2g + 2] code
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over GF (q). We know that the functional code is just the evaluations of functions in L(G) at the
setD and the residual code is just the residues of differentials in Ω(G−D) at the setD (see [17-19]).
We also know that CL(D,G) and CΩ(D,G) are dual codes. It is known that for a differ-
ential η that has poles at P1, ...Pn with residue 1 (there always exists such a η, see[18]) we have
CΩ(D,G) = CL(D,D −G+ (η)), the function f corresponds to the differential fη. This means
that functional codes and residue code are essentially the same. It is clear that if there exist a
differential η such that G = D−G+ (η), then CL(P,G) = CΩ(P,G) = CL(P,P −G+ (η)) is a
self-dual code over GF (q), in many cases the matroids from AG-codes can be computed explicitly
from the algebraic-geometric structure of the underlying curves, thus we have many interesting
examples of self-dually GF (q)-representable matroids (see section VI below)from this construction.
For many examples of AG codes, including these self-dual AG-codes, we refer to [17],[18] and [19].
II Main Results
Let X be an absolutely irreducible, projective and smooth curve defined over GF (q) with genus
g, D = {P0, ...Pn} be a set of GF (q)-rational points of X and G be a GF (q)-rational divisor with
degree m satisfying supp(G)
⋂
D =, 2g−2 < m < n+1. We can have a LSSS on the n participants
P = {P1, ..., Pn} from the linear code CΩ(D,G), thus we know that the reconstruction of the secret
is based from its dual code CL(D,G). For the curve with genus 0 over GF (q), we have exactly
the same LSSS as Shamir’s (k, n)-threshold scheme, since the AG-codes over the curve of genus 0
is just the RS codes (see [17-19]).
The following are the main results of this paper.
Theorem 1. The LSSS over GF (q) from the code CΩ(D,G) has the following properties.
1) This LSSS is ideal;
2) Any subset A ⊆ P satisfying |A| < n −m is not qualified subset, any subset A ⊆ P satisfying
|A| ≥ n−m+ 2g is qualified.
Proposition 1. Let X,D,P and G as above. Suppose the genus g of X is not 0, n > 3 and
the minimum (Hamming) distance d(CL(D,G)) is exactly n + 1 − deg(G) > 2. Then the LSSS
from the residue code CΩ(D,G) is not a threshold secret-sharing scheme.
Proposition 2. For the LSSS over GF (q) from the code CL(D,G) we have n−m ≤ dmin ≤
dcheat ≤ n−m+ 2g.
Theorem 2. The LSSS over GF (q) from the code CΩ(D,G) has the following properties.
1) This LSSS is multiplicative if m ≥ n2 + 2g;
2) This LSSS is strongly multiplicative if m ≥ 2n3 + 2g .
Let X,D,P and G as above, A is the adversary structure of the LSSS from the residue code
CΩ(D,G). Then we have the following result (for the definitions in the following result we refer
to [10] and [11]).
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Theorem 3. For the finite field GF (q) and the adversary structure A as above.
1) If m ≥ 2n3 + 2g, then there exists a polynomial complexity error-free VSS (Verifiable Secret-
Sharing , over GF (q))protocol in the information-theoretic scenario, secure against any active and
adaptive A-adversary.
2) If m ≥ 2n3 + 2g, for any arithmetic circuit U over GF (q), then there exists a polynomial com-
plexity error-free MPC (Multi-party Computation)protocol computing U in the information-theoretic
scenario, secure against any adaptive and active A-adversary.
3) If m ≥ n2 +2g, for any arithmetic circuit U over GF (q), then there exists a polynomial complex-
ity error-free MPC (Multi-party Computation)protocol computing U in the information-theoretic
scenario, secure against any adaptive and passive A-adversary.
Proof of Theorem 1. 1) is clear from the construction. If A is a qualified subset of
P, then there exists a codeword in CL(D,G) such that this codeword is not zero at P0 and
some Pi’s in the subset A, and this codeword is zero at P − A (Lemma 1). Thus we have
|A| ≥ n + 1 − m − 1 = n − m. On the other hand if A ⊂ P and |A| ≥ n − m + 2g we have
that dim(L(G − Ac) ≥ deg(G − Ac) − g + 1 ≥ g + 1 from Riemann-Roch theorem (see [17-20]),
where Ac = P− A. We also know that the linear system (see [20]) defined by the divisor G− Ac
has no base point since deg(G − Ac) ≥ 2g (see [20]). Thus we have one function f ∈ L(G − Ac)
such that f is not zero at P0 and zero at all points in the set A
c, so the codeword in CL(D,G)
corresponding to this f is not zero at P0 and not zero at a subset A (or A itself). So A is qualified.
Proof of Proposition 1. If the LSSS from CΩ(D,G) is a threshold scheme, it is a (n−m,m)
scheme since d(CL(D,G)) = n+1−m. This imply that any subset A of P with cardinality |A| = m
is linearly equivalent (A is considered as a divisor, see [20] for the definition of linear equivalence),
since n > 3 and n−m > 1, we know that any two points in P are linear equivalent, so dim(L(Pi)) ≥
2 for any point Pi ∈ P. From Riemann-Roch Theorem dim(L(K − Pi)) = dim(L(K)) = g, where
K is a canonical divisor of the curve X. If g = 1, this is obviously not true since K = 0 in this
case. If g ≥ 2, it is known that the canonical linear system has no base point. This is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 2. It is clear dmin is the minimum distance of the code CL(P,G), so
dmin ≥ n−m. On the other hand the minimum Hamming weight of CΩ(D,G) is at least m−2g+2,
thus maxB∈2P−Γ|B| ≤ m− 2g. Thus dcheat = n−maxB∈2P−Γ|B| ≤ n−m+ 2g. The conclusion is
proved.
Proof of Theorem 2. Suppose to secret are distributed, we know that the shares of the
participant Pi are just the function values f1(Pi), f2(Pi), where fi is a function in L(D − G +
(η))(corresponding to fη in Ω(G − D)). The secrets are just the function values f1(P0), f2(P0)
at P0. Here we have f1f2 ∈ L(2(D − G + (η))). If 2g − 2 < deg(2(D − G + (η))) < n,
CΩ(D,2(D −G+ (η))) is the (non-zero) dual code of CL(D,2(D −G+ (η))). Thus there is
a non-zero codeword in CΩ(D,2(D −G+ (η))). On the other hand if the linear system corre-
sponding to Ω(2(D−G+(η))) (corresponding to L(2G−D− (η))) has no base point( it is valid if
deg(2G−D− (η)) ≥ 2g, see [20]), we can make this codeword in CΩ(D,2(D−G+ (η))) not zero
at the position P0. Thus f1(P0)f2(P0) is a linear combination of the f1(P1)f2(P1), ..., f1(Pn)f2(Pn).
The conclusion of 1) is proved.
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For the conclusion 2), we only need to prove that the linear system corresponding to L(2G −
D− (η) −H) has no base point for any H a unqualified subset of P. From Theorem 1 deg(H) <
n −m+ 2g. Thus the conclusion of 2) is true if deg(2G −D− (η) −H) ≥ 2g. The conclusion of
2) is proved.
Proof of Theorem 3. From Theorem 1 we know that each subset H of P in the adversary
structure has at most n−m+2g−1 elements. The adversary structure is Q2 if m ≥
n
2 +2g and Q3
if m ≥ 2m3 + 2g. Then the conclusions of Theorem 3 follow from Theorem 2 and the main results
in [10] directly.
We should note that the parameters m can be chosen quite flexibly as in the theory of AG-
codes( see [17-19]).
III An Asymptotic Result.
For any given finite field GF (q2) where q is a prime power, it is known there exists a family of
smooth projective curves {Xt}(t=1,2,...) defined over GF (q
2) with N ′t rational points(over GF (q
2))
and genus gt such that lim
N ′t
gt
= q − 1 (see f.g. [21]), the family of curves over GF (q2) attaining
the Drinfeld-Vladut bound (see [18-19]). This family of curves is important for the existence of the
family of AG-codes exceeding the Gilbert-Varshamov bound. By choosing m suitably we can have
a similar asymptotic result for the LSSS from AG-codes.
Corollary 1. For any given finite field GF (q2) with q2 (q ≥ 11 ) elements, there exists a family
of natural numbers {Nt}(t=1,2,...) such that {Nt}(t=1,2,...) go to infinity, a family of access structures
{Γt} on the set of Nt elements with the property that any subset less than k
1
t elements is not in Γt
and any subset more than k2t elements is in Γt . We can construct
1) ideal GF (q2)-LSSS with the access structure Γt;
2) VSS over GF (q2) secure against any adaptive and active Γct -adversary structures (Γ
c
t consisting
of subsets not in Γt);
3) MPC (computing any arithmetic circuit over GF (q2)) secure against any adaptive and active
Γct-adversary.
Moreover the parameters (k1t , k
2
t , Nt) can be chosen satisfying lim
k1t
Nt
= R1 > 0 and lim
k2t
Nt
= R2 =
R1 +
2
q−1 > 0 for arbitrary given R1 ∈ (0,
1
3 −
2
q−1) .
This result follows from the main result in [21] and Theorem 1,2,3 above directly.
IV LSSS from Elliptic Curves
We need to recall the following result in [22-23].
Theorem 4(see [22]). 1) Let E be an elliptic curve over GF (q) with the group of GF (q)-
rational points E(GF (q)). Then E(GF (q)) is isomorphic to Zn1
⊕
Zn2, where n1 is a divisor of
q − 1 and n2
2) If E is supersingular, then E(GF (q)) is either
6
a) cyclic;
b) or Z2
⊕
Z q+1
2
;
c) or Z√q−1
⊕
Z√q−1;
d) or Z√q+1
⊕
Z√q+1.
In this section and the section VI we analysis the access structure of the LSSS from the elliptic
curves and the self-dually GF (q)-representable matroid from the AG-codes on elliptic curves.
For any given elliptic curve E over GF (q), from the above Theorem let D′ = {0, g1, ...gH−1} be a
subgroup of E(GF (q)) which is of order H(Here 0 us the zero element of the group). 0, g1, ..., gH−1
correspond to the rational points O,P1, P2, ..., PH−1 of E. In the construction of section II, we take
G = mO, D = {P1, ..., PH−1} and P = {P2, ..., PH−1}. We have the following result.
Theorem 5. a) Let A = {Pi1 , ..., Pim} be a subset of P with m elements, A
c is a minimal
qualified subset for the LSSS from CΩ(D,G) if and only if gi1 + ...+ gim = 0 in E(GF (q));
b) Let A = {Pi1 , ..., Pim−1} be a subset of P with m− 1 elements, A
c is a minimal qualified subset
for the LSSS from CΩ(D,G) if and only if gi1 + ... + gim−1 = 0 in E(GF (q)) or there exists a
j ∈ {i1, ..., im−1} such that gi1 + ...+ gim−1 + gj = 0 in E(GF (q));
c) Any subset of P with at least H −m+ 2 elements is qualified.
Proof. We know that for any t points W1, ...,Wt in E(GF (q)) the divisor W1 + ... +Wt − tO
is linear equivalent to the divisor W − O, where W is the group sum of W1, ...,Wt in the group
E(GF (q)). From the proof of Theorem 1, {Pi1 , ..., Pim}
c is a qualified subset (therefor minimal
qualified subset) if there exist a function f ∈ L(G) such that f(Pi1) = ... = f(Pim) = 0, this means
that the divisor Pi1 + ...+ Pim is linearly equivalent to G = mO. The conclusion of 1) is proved.
From the proof of Theorem 1, {Pi1 , ..., Pim−1}
c is a qualified subset if there exist a function
f ∈ L(G) such that f(Pi1) = ... = f(Pim−1) = 0, this means that the divisor Pi1 + ...+Pim−1 +B is
linearly equivalent to G = mO for some effective divisor B. It is clear that deg(B) = 1 and B is a
GF (q)-rational point in E. From the group structure of E(GF (q)), B is in D′. On the other hand
we note that B 6= P0, so B is O or a point in P. The conclusion of 1) is proved. The conclusion of
3) follows from Theorem 1 directly.
Example 1. Let E be the elliptic curve y2 = x3+5x+4 defined over GF (7). Then E(GF (7)) is
a cyclic group of order 10 with O the point at infinity and P0 = (3, 2), P1 = (2, 6), P2 = (4, 2), P3 =
(0, 5) P4 = (5, 0), P5 = (0, 2), P6 = (4, 5), P7 = (2, 1), P8 = (3, 5). From an easy computation we
know that P0 is a generator of E(GF (7)) and Pi is (i+1)P0 (in the group operation of E(GF (7)).)
We take G = 3O,D = {P0, P1, ..., P8}, then the access structure of the ideal GF (7)-LSSS from
CΩ(D,G) are the following subsets of P = {P1, ..., P8}.
1) All subsets of P with 7 elements and the set P;
2) The following 10 subsets of 6 elements {P1, P3}
c {P1, P5}
c,{P1, P7}
c,{P1, P8}
c {P2, P3}
c,{P2, P6}
c,
{P3, P5}
c,{P3, P7}
c,{P5, P6}
c,{P5, P7}
c are the minimal qualified subset;
3) The following 5 subsets with 5 elements {P1, P2, P4}
c,{P2, P7, P8}
c,{P3, P6, P8}
c, {P4, P5, P8}
c,
{P4, P6, P7}
c are the minimal qualified subset.
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Example 2. Let E be the elliptic curve y2 + y = x3 defined over GF (4). This is the Hermi-
tian curve over GF (4), it has 9 rational points and E(GF (4)) is isomorphic to Z3
⊕
Z3. We take
G = 3O, where O is the zero element in the group E(GF (4)). Let Pij be the rational point on E
corresponding to (i, j) in Z3
⊕
Z3. D = {P10, P01, ..., P22},P = {P01, ..., P22}.
Then the qualified subsets of the ideal LSSS from CΩ(D,G) are as follows.
1) The minimal qualified subsets of 4 elements are {P20, P21, P02}
c,{P01, P20, P22}
c,{P11, P12, P20}
c.
2) The minimal qualified subsets of 5 elements are {P01, P02}
c,{P11, P22}
c,{P12, P21}
c.
3) The subsets of P of 6 elements and the set P are qualified.
V LSSS from Klein Quartic
Klein quartic is the genus 3 curve x3y + y3z + z3x = 0 ( in the projective plane) defined
over GF (8). It is well-known there are 24 rational points (over GF (8), see [23]).It is clear that
Q1 = (1 : 0 : 0), Q2 = (0 : 1 : 0), Q3 = (0 : 0 : 1) are 3 rational points on X. The line L0 : y = 0
intersects X at 3Q1+Q3 (count with multiplicity, see [20]). The line Lαi : y = αix, where α1, ..., α7
are 7 non-zero elements of GF (8), intersects X at Q3 and other 3 rational points. Set P be the
set of these 21 rational points, G = 3Q1 +Q3 and D = {Q2}
⋃
P. We consider the LSSS from the
residue code CΩ(D,G).
In this case though deg(G) = 2g − 2, CL(D,G) (dimension 3) and CΩ(D,G)( dimension 19)
are dual codes(see [19]).
It should be noted that the line passing through any two distinct points in P have to pass the
other 2 points in the set P(see [23]).
Proposition 3. The minimal qualified subset of the LSSS from CΩ(D,G) are the subsets of
P of the form {P1, P2, P3}
c, where P1, P2, P3 and Q3 are on the line Lαi for some i ∈ {1, , ..., 7},
or {P ′1, P
′
2, P
′
3, P
′
4}
c for some 4 points in P which are on one line.
Proof. From Riemann-Roch Theorem dim(L(G)) = 3, so {x, y, z} are the base. So every
function in L(G) is of the form ax+by+cz
y
. The subset Ac of P is qualified if and only if there exists
one f ∈ L(G) such that f is zero on A, the conclusion follows directly.
VI Self Dually GF (q) Representable Matroids from AG-codes
For X,D,G as in section 2, if there exist a differential η on X such that D −G + (η) = G
then the matroid from the code CL(D,G) is self-dully GF (q)-representable. In many cases from
algebraic geometry the matroid of the corresponding AG-codes CΩ(D,G) = CL(D,G) can be
calculated. This offers many examples of new self-dually representable matroids (see [3] for the
background).
Let E be an elliptic curve defined over GF (q), it is known that the canonical divisor of E is
zero, so the condition that there exists a differential η such that D−G+ (η) = G is equivalent to
the condition that D−G and G are linear equivalent.
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Let D = {g1, ...gH} be a subset of non-zero elements in E(GF (q)), where H is even and the
group sum of all elements in D is zero in E(GF (q)). g1, ..., gH correspond to the rational points
P1, ..., PH of E. In the construction, we take G = mO, where m =
H
2 and O corresponds to the
zero element of E(GF (q), D = {P1, ..., PH}. Here it is easy to know that D (as a divisor) is linear
equivalent to HO. So we know that D−G is linear equivalent to G. We have the following result.
Theorem 6. a) Let A = {Pi1 , ..., Pim} be a subset of D with m elements, A
c is a circuit of the
matroid defined by CΩ(D,G) = CL(D,G) if and only if gi1 + ...+ gim = 0 in E(GF (q));
b) Let A = {Pi1 , ..., Pim−1} be a subset of D with m − 1 elements, A
c is a circuit of the matroid
defined by CΩ(D,G) = CL(D,G) if and only if gi1 + ... + gim−1 = 0 in E(GF (q)) or there exists
a non-zero element g ∈ (E(GF (q)) −D)
⋃
A such that gi1 + ...+ gim−1 + g = 0 in E(GF (q)).
The proof of Theorem 6 is similar to that of Theorem 5.
Example 3. Let E be the elliptic curve y2 = x3 + 5x + 4 defined over GF (7). Then
E(GF (7)) is a cyclic group of order 10 with O the point at infinity and P0 = (3, 2), P1 =
(2, 6), P2 = (4, 2), P3 = (0, 5) P4 = (5, 0), P5 = (0, 2), P6 = (4, 5), P7 = (2, 1), P8 = (3, 5).Set
D = {P0, P1, P2, P3, P5, P6, P7, P8}, G = 4O. It is clear the group sum of all points in D is zero.
Then the circuits of the self-dually GF (7) representable matroid defined by CΩ(D,G) = Cl(D,G)
are the following subsets of D.
1) The following 8 subsets of 4 elements {P0, P1, P2, P4}
c, {P0, P1, P7, P8}
c, {P0, P2, P6, P8}
c,
{P0, P3, P5, P8}
c, {P0, P3, P6, P7}
c, {P1, P2, P6, P7}
c, {P1, P3, P5, P7}
c, {P2, P3, P5, P6}
c;
3) The following 15 subsets with 5 elements {P0, P1, P6}
c, {P0, P2, P5}
c, {P2, P7, P8}
c,
{P3, P6, P8}
c, {P0, P5, P7}
c, {P1, P5, P6}
c, {P1, P3, P8}
c, {P2, P3, P7}
c, {P0, P1, P5}
c, {P0, P5, P6}
c,
{P0, P2, P7}
c, {P1, P6, P8}
c, {P1, P3, P6}
c, {P2, P5, P7}
c, {P3, P7, P8}
c.
Example 4. Let E be the elliptic curve y2 + y = x3 defined over GF (4). This is the Hermi-
tian curve over GF (4), it has 9 rational points and E(GF (4)) is isomorphic to Z3
⊕
Z3. We take
G = 4O, where O is the zero element in the group E(GF (4)). Let Pij be the rational point on
E corresponding to (i, j) in Z3
⊕
Z3. Let G = 4O and D = {P10, P01, ..., P22} be the 8 non-zero
elements of E(GF (4)). It is clear that D −G and G are linear equivalent. Then the circuits of
the self-dually GF (4) representable matroid defined by CΩ(D,G) = CL(D,G) are the following
subsets of D.
1) The 6 subsets of 4 elements are {P01, P02, P10, P20}
c, {P01, P02, P11, P22}
c, {P01, P02, P12, P21}
c,
{P10, P20, P11, P22}
c, {P10, P20, P12, P21}
c, {P12, P21, P11, P22}
c;
2) The 32 subsets of 5 elements are {P01, P10, P22}
c, {P01, P11, P21}
c, {P01, P12, P20}
c, {P02, P10, P21}
c,
{P02, P11, P20}
c, {P02, P12, P22}
c, {P10, P11, P12}
c, {P20, P21, P22}
c, {P02, P10, P22}
c, {P01, P20, P22}
c,
{P01, P10, P11}
c, {P02, P11, P21}
c, {P01, P22, P21}
c, {P01, P11, P12}
c, {P02, P12, P20}
c, {P01, P21, P20}
c,
{P01, P12, P10}
c, {P01, P10, P21}
c, {P02, P20, P21}
c, {P02, P10, P12}
c, {P01, P11, P20}
c, {P02, P22, P20}
c,
{P02, P11, P10}
c, {P01, P12, P22}
c, {P02, P12, P22}
c, {P02, P11, P12}
c, {P20, P12, P11}
c, {P10, P22, P12}
c,
{P10, P11, P21}
c, {P10, P21, P22}
c, {P20, P12, P22}
c, {P20, P21, P11}
c.
VII Conclusions
We have presented the ideal linear secret-sharing scheme from the AG-codes on algebraic curves,
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which can be thought as a natural generalization of Shamir’s (k, n)-threshold scheme(from AG-codes
on the genus 0 curve, RS codes). These ideal linear secret-sharing schemes are not threshold for
positive genus curves, which offer many new examples of access structures of ideal LSSS. The gen-
eral properties of LSSS from AG-codes are proved and their applications in verifiable secret-sharing
and secure multi-party computation are presented. New examples of self-dually representable ma-
troids from self-dual AG-codes have been calculated. We demonstrated that the algebraic-geometric
structure of the underlying curves is an important resource for secret-sharing, multi-party compu-
tation and the theory of matroids.
Note. After this paper was completed and submitted, the author was informed by Professor R.
Cramer of his paper”Algebraic geometric secret sharing schemes and secure computation over small
fields”, in which the idea of using algebraic-geometric codes in secret sharing and secure computa-
tion was independently developed.
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